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Nontechnical Summary
Even though wage inequality in West Germany started to rise at the top of the wage
distribution in the 1980s, this rise was delayed for about ten years at the bottom. Our
paper investigates the changes in the German wage structure for full–time working males
from 1999 to 2006. We find a noticeable increase of wage inequality during this time
period. The difference of the log wages, measured at the 80th and the 20th percentile,
rises by about 8 percentage points. Wage inequality increases by about the same extent
both at the bottom and the top of the wage distribution.
The most prominent explanation in the literature for the increase in wage inequality
in the US and the UK is skill–biased technical change (SBTC) resulting in an increasing
demand for more highly skilled labor (see the survey by Katz and Autor, 1999). The in-
crease in demand is stronger than the parallel increases in the supply of more highly skilled
labor. The developments in Germany for the 1980s are consistent with the SBTC hypoth-
esis (Fitzenberger, 1999), if one allows for the possibility that growing wage inequality in
the lower part of the wage distribution is prevented by labor market institutions such as
unions and implicit minimum wages implied by the welfare state.
Our analysis builds upon the task–based approach introduced by Autor et al. (2003),
as implemented by Spitz-Oener (2006) for Germany. Autor et al. (2003) operationalize
the way technology affects the labor market through the tasks workers perform at their
job. This task–based approach argues that technological change results in a substitution
of routine tasks by computers and other machines. Therefore, demand for workers per-
forming nonroutine tasks increases. For the US, Autor et al. (2003) analyze data at the
occupational level and confirm that the employment in jobs involving routine tasks has
fallen considerably. Spitz-Oener (2006) documents similar changes in tasks for Germany
until the end of the 1990s as in the US. She uses the four waves of the ”Qualification and
Occupational Career” survey from the late 1970s to the late 1990s, which includes explicit
information about the performing tasks at the job. A similar survey called ”Working-
Population-Survey” was redone in 2006 involving comparable task description.
Our study here is the first study to make simultaneous use of the 2006 and the 1999
survey and the first study to analyze the most recent changes in wage inequality for full–
time working males in Germany in light of the task–based approach. Even though the
task–based approach is successful in explaining changes in the distribution of skill groups
and the change in occupations, it is difficult to rationalize the fairly large stability of the
wage structure in Germany at the bottom of the distribution until the mid 1990s based on
this hypothesis. Therefore, it is of interest to investigate whether a task–based approach
can rationalize the recent rise in wage inequality in Germany.
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Furthermore, in addition to the task categories used by Spitz-Oener (2006) for Ger-
many, we also use two proxies for job complexity. Changing from routine to non-routine
tasks is likely to increase job complexity because workers have to perform different tasks
simultaneously and the necessity to responding flexibly to changing demands at jobs has
increased. We suggest a different operationalization of the five task categories used by
Spitz-Oener (2006), which allows us to separately identify the wage effects of task assign-
ment in those five task categories from our two proxies for job complexity.
Finally, we perform a Blinder–Oaxaca type decomposition of the changes in the entire
wage distribution between 1999 and 2006 into the separate effects of personal characteris-
tics and task assignments. The decomposition results show that the changes in personal
characteristics explain some of the increase in wage inequality whereas the changes in
task assignments strongly work towards reducing wage inequality. The coefficient effect
for personal characteristics works towards an increase in wage inequality in the upper part
of the wage distribution. The coefficient effect for the task assignments on the contrary
shows an inverted U–shaped pattern.
We conclude that the task–based approach can not explain the recent increase in wage
inequality among male employees in Germany. Only at the bottom of the wage distri-
bution, the change in task coefficients has contributed to the increase in wage inequality.
Thus, wages for the tasks demanded in low wage jobs have fallen disproportionately over
time. The latter can be rationalized in light of the polarization hypothesis by a low degree
of complementarity between low–wage jobs and high–wage jobs (Autor and Dorn, 2008).
Furthermore, our findings suggest to analyze the impact of institutional changes, such as
deunionization (see Dustmann et al., 2007) and the labor market reforms, as potential
explanations for the recent increase in wage inequality.
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Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Obwohl die Lohnungleichheit in Westdeutschland im oberen Bereich der Verteilung
seit den 80er Jahren anstieg, kann erst etwa 10 Jahre spa¨ter ab Mitte der 90er Jahre
ein Anstieg der Lohnungleichheit im unteren Bereich der Lohnverteilung beobachtet wer-
den. In der vorliegenden Arbeit untersuchen wir fu¨r vollzeiterwerbsta¨tige Ma¨nner die
Vera¨nderungen der Lohnstruktur in Westdeutschland zwischen 1999 und 2006 und stellen
einen beachtlichen Anstieg der Lohndispersion in diesem Zeitraum fest. Der Abstand
zwischen dem 80. und 20. Perzentil der logarithmierten Lo¨hne vergro¨ßert sich um 8 log-
Prozentpunkte wa¨hrend dieses Zeitraums. Im oberen und im unteren Bereich der Lohn-
verteilung nimmt die Lohnungleichheit im selben Umfang zu.
Eine in der Literatur verbreitete Erkla¨rung fu¨r die Vera¨nderungen der Lohnstruktur
in den USA und in Großbritannien ist der qualifikationsverzerrte technische Fortschritt
(”Skill-Biased Technical Change”, SBTC), welcher eine steigende Nachfrage von hoch-
qualifizierten Arbeitskra¨ften unterstellt (vgl. Katz und Autor, 1999). Der Anstieg der
Nachfrage fa¨llt ho¨her aus als der parallel verlaufende Anstieg des Angebots an hoch-
qualifizierten Arbeitskra¨ften. In Deutschland lassen sich die Entwicklungen in den 1980er
Jahren im Einklang mit der SBTC Theorie erkla¨ren (Fitzenberger, 1999) – vorausge-
setzt man unterstellt, dass eine steigende Lohnungleichheit im unteren Teil der Lohn-
verteilung durch Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen wie Gewerkschaften und implizit eingefu¨hrte
Mindestlo¨hne durch den Wohlfahrtsstaat verhindert wird.
Diese Arbeit fu¨hrt eine empirische Analyse auf Basis des von Autor et al. (2003)
eingefu¨hrten und fu¨r Deutschland von Spitz-Oener (2006) implementierten ”Task-Based
Approach” durch. Autor et al. (2003) operationalisieren den Transmissionsmechanismus,
mit dem Technologie in Form der von den Arbeitskra¨ften ausgefu¨hrten Ta¨tigkeiten den
Arbeitsmarkt vera¨ndert. Dieser ”Task-Based Approach” legt dar, wie die vera¨nderte
Technologie zu einer Substitution von Routine-Ta¨tigkeiten durch Computer und Maschi-
nen fu¨hrt. Demzufolge steigt die Nachfrage nach Arbeitskra¨ften, die Nicht-Routine-
Ta¨tigkeiten ausu¨ben. Autor et al. (2003) analysieren berufsbezogene Daten fu¨r die USA
und kommen zu dem Schluss, dass die Anzahl der auf Routine-Ta¨tigkeiten basierenden
Arbeitspla¨tze betra¨chtlich zuru¨ckgegangen ist. Spitz-Oener (2006) stellt fu¨r Deutschland
a¨hnliche Vera¨nderungen der Ta¨tigkeiten wie in den USA fest. Sie verwendet die vier
Wellen der Daten der Erhebung ”Qualifikation und Berufsverlauf”, die zwischen 1979
und 1999 erhoben wurden und die explizite Informationen zu den am Arbeitsplatz aus-
gefu¨hrten Ta¨tigkeiten enthalten. Im Jahr 2006 wurde mit der Erwerbsta¨tigenbefragung
eine a¨hnliche Studie mit vergleichbaren Angaben zu den Ta¨tigkeiten erhoben.
Die vorliegende Arbeit ist die erste Untersuchung welche die Wellen von 1999 und
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2006 gemeinsam verwendet und zugleich die erste Studie, die die neuesten Vera¨nderungen
der Lohnungleichheit fu¨r vollzeiterwerbsta¨tige Ma¨nner in Deutschland mit dem ”Task-
Based Approach” analysiert. Die hohe Stabilita¨t der Lohnstruktur in Deutschland im
unteren Bereich der Verteilung bis Mitte der 90er Jahre ist gerade aufgrund der durch
den ”Task-Based Approach” festgestellten vera¨nderten Aufteilung der Bildungsgruppen
sowie den Wandel innerhalb der Berufe schwer zu erkla¨ren. Deshalb ist es lohnenswert
zu untersuchen, ob der ”Task-Based Approach” den ju¨ngst zu beobachtenden starken
Anstieg der Lohnungleichheit erkla¨ren kann.
Zusa¨tzlich zu den Ta¨tigkeits-Kategorien, welche Spitz-Oener (2006) verwendet, im-
plementieren wir zwei Variablen zur Messung von Job-Komplexita¨t. Es liegt nahe, dass
ein Wandel von Routine- hin zu Nicht-Routine-Ta¨tigkeiten zu einem Anstieg der Job-
Komplexita¨t fu¨hrt, da Arbeitskra¨fte in ihrem Job zunehmend verschiedene Ta¨tigkeiten si-
multan ausfu¨hren, sowie notwendigerweise flexibel auf wechselnde Anforderungen reagieren
mu¨ssen. Weiterhin schlagen wir eine Operationalisierung der fu¨nf Ta¨tigkeits-Kategorien
vor, welche eine von unseren zwei Job-Komplexita¨ts-Maßen differenzierte Betrachtung der
Effekte des Lohns auf die Ta¨tigkeits-Kategorien zula¨sst und sich somit von der Messung
von Spitz-Oener (2006) unterscheidet.
Des Weiteren fu¨hren wir eine Blinder-Oaxaca Dekomposition der Vera¨nderungen der
gesamten Lohnstruktur zwischen 1999 und 2006 durch und trennen die Einflu¨sse der
perso¨nlichen Charakteristika von denen der Ta¨tigkeiten bzw. des Aufgabengebiets. Die
Ergebnisse der Dekomposition zeigen, dass die Vera¨nderungen der perso¨nlichen Charak-
teristika einen Teil der ansteigenden Lohnungleichheit erkla¨ren ko¨nnen, wa¨hrend die
Vera¨nderung der Ta¨tigkeiten die Lohnungleichhheit stark reduziert. Der Koeffizienten-
Effekt der perso¨nlichen Charakteristika versta¨rkt die Zunahme der Lohnungleichheit im
oberen Bereich der Lohnverteilung. Der Einfluss des Koeffizienten-Effekts der Ta¨tigkeiten
weist einen umgekehrt U-fo¨rmigen Verlauf auf.
Wir kommen zu dem Ergebnis, dass ein ”Task-Based Approach” den gegenwa¨rti-
gen Anstieg der Lohnungleichheit der ma¨nnlichen Erwerbsta¨tigen in Deutschland nicht
erkla¨ren kann. Nur im unteren Bereich der Lohnverteilung liefert die Vera¨nderung der
Ta¨tigkeits-Koeffizienten einen Erkla¨rungsbeitrag hinsichtlich der zunehmenden Lohnun-
gleichheit. Demzufolge fielen die Lo¨hne fu¨r die im unteren Bereich der Lohnverteilung
nachgefragten Ta¨tigkeiten unverha¨ltnisma¨ßig stark. Letzteres kann im Licht der Polari-
sationshypothese infolge eines geringen Komplementarita¨ts-Grades zwischen niedrig- und
ho¨herbezahlten Jobs erkla¨rt werden (Autor and Dorn, 2008). Letztendlich legen unsere
Ergebnisse nahe, den Wandel der Institutionen, wie den Ru¨ckgang des gewerkschaftlichen
Organisationsgrades (siehe Dustmann et al., 2007) und die Arbeitsmarktreformen, als
mo¨gliche Ursache fu¨r die steigende Lohnungleichheit zu untersuchen.
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1 Introduction
Wage inequality has been rising in Germany after all (Fitzenberger, 1999; Dustmann et al.,
2007; Kohn, 2006; Gernandt and Pfeiffer, 2007).1 In comparison to the strong increase in
wage inequality in the US and the UK since the early 1980s (Katz and Autor, 1999; Goos
and Manning, 2007), the increase of wage inequality in Germany has been delayed and
less pronounced. The increase of wage inequality in Germany was restricted to the top
of the wage distribution in the 1980s and at the bottom of the wage distribution, it only
started to grow in the mid 1990s. This is in contrast to the US, where wage inequality in
the 1990s continued to grow at the top of the wage distribution, whereas wage inequality
at the bottom did not grow further (Autor et al., 2008). Our paper investigates recent
changes in wage inequality in Germany for the time period 1999 to 2006 in light of the
tasked based approach of Autor et al. (2003).
The most prominent explanation in the literature for the wage changes in the US
and the UK is skill–biased technical change (SBTC) resulting in an increasing demand
for more highly skilled labor (see the survey by Katz and Autor, 1999). The increase
in demand is stronger than the parallel increases in the supply of more highly skilled
labor. Furthermore, Acemoglu (1998) argues that the rise in the supply of high-skilled
workers in the 1970s and 1980s through the expansion of the education system resulted
in the development of skill-complementary technologies causing SBTC. The simple SBTC
hypothesis predicts rising wage inequality over the entire wage distribution, which is not
consistent with the fact that inequality at the bottom of the wage distribution in the US
stopped to grow further during the 1990s despite a continuous improvement of computer
technology (Acemoglu, 1998; Goos and Manning, 2007). The developments in Germany
for the 1980s are consistent with the SBTC hypothesis (Fitzenberger, 1999), if one allows
for the possibility that growing wage inequality at the bottom of the wage distribution
is prevented by labor market institutions such as unions and implicit minimum wages
implied by the welfare state. In a similar vein for the US, DiNardo et al. (1996) argue that
increasing wage inequality in the 1980s and the early 1990s may partly be explained by
changing labor market institutions, i.e. falling real minimum wages and deunionization.
Based on administrative data from the IAB, Dustmann et al. (2007) show that wage
inequality in West Germany has been rising since the 1980s.2 The study argues that
wage inequality at the top of the wage distribution began to rise during the 1980s (see
also Fitzenberger, 1999 and Fitzenberger and Kohn, 2006) whereas wage inequality at the
1The first sentence is a variation of the title of the paper by Kohn (2006).
2See also Kohn (2006), and Gernandt and Pfeiffer (2007) who document rising wage inequality in West
Germany since the mid 1990s based on the IAB data and the German Socioeconomic Panel, respectively.
1
bottom of the wage distribution only started to increase during the 1990s. The strong
deunionization (Fitzenberger et al., 2006) is likely to have contributed to the increase
in inequality at the bottom of the wage distribution. Gernandt and Pfeiffer (2007) find
that the increase in wage inequality between 1994 and 2005 has been much stronger for
workers with low tenure compared to workers with high tenure. Thus, changes in wages
over time seem to take place predominantly for new hirings whereas workers with higher
tenure seem much less affected.
Autor et al. (2003) propose a nuanced version of the SBTC hypothesis by operational-
izing the way technology affects the labor market through the tasks performed at a job.
Occupations are distinguished by the composition of the different tasks. This task–based
approach argues that technological change results in a substitution of routine tasks by
computers and other machines. Therefore, demand for workers performing non-routine
tasks increases. For the US, Autor et al. (2003) analyze data at the occupational level and
confirm that the employment in jobs involving routine tasks has fallen considerably. In a
recent study, Autor and Dorn (2008) show that demand for low–skill service jobs, which
pay low wages, has increased because these jobs involve mostly non-routine manual tasks
requiring physical and interpersonal flexibility but little formal education. Spitz-Oener
(2006) uses unique German survey data (four waves of the ”Qualification and Occupa-
tional Career” survey from the late 1970s until the late 1990s) which include information
on the tasks individual workers perform. She documents similar changes in tasks for Ger-
many until the end of the 1990s as in the US. In particular, her analysis also shows a large
increase in jobs involving non-routine manual tasks which tend to be low–wage jobs. As a
big advantage, the German data allow to distinguish tasks from occupations. Even though
the task approach is successful in explaining changes in the distribution of skill groups
and the change in occupations, it is difficult to rationalize the fairly large stability of the
wage structure in Germany until the mid 1990s based on this hypothesis.3 Therefore, it
is of interest to investigate whether a task–based approach can rationalize the recent rise
in wage inequality in Germany. For this, we use the same data as Spitz-Oener (2006) for
the late 1990s and more recent data for 2006 in our analysis.
In contrast to the simple SBTC hypothesis, trends in wage inequality differ between the
bottom and the top of the wage distribution. This has spurred interest in the so called
polarization hypothesis. Manning (2004), Goos and Manning (2007), and Autor and
Dorn (2008) argue that the task–based approach may also rationalize the empirical fact
3In a recent study, Black and Spitz-Oener (2007) extend the task-based approach to analyze the change
in the gender wage gap between 1979 and 1999. They find that the change in task inputs explains partly
the reduction of the gender wage gap. Moreover, their results confirm the polarization theory in the labor
market regarding the growth of both low-skilled and high–skilled employment.
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that the share of low wage jobs involving non-routine tasks with very low skill input has
increased. These jobs traditionally paid less than many of the routine jobs requiring higher
skill input. This is the basis for the polarization hypothesis stating that technological
change may result in a reduction of jobs in the middle of the wage distribution implying
a disproportionate growth of both high wage and low wage jobs. Based on the falling
demand for workers in middle occupations, one might expect that wage inequality falls
at the bottom of the wage distribution and increases at the top of the wage distribution.
Even though Goos and Manning (2007) find evidence for the growth of both low–wage
and high–wage jobs, the polarization hypothesis can not rationalize that wage inequality
did not fall at the bottom of the wage distribution. Autor and Dorn (2008) clarify that
the polarization hypothesis may also be consistent with rising wage inequality at the
bottom of the wage distribution, when the manual low–skill jobs at the bottom of the wage
distribution exhibit very low productivity levels and the complementarities between goods
produced by high–skilled workers and services in the low–skill jobs are not strong.4 For
Germany, Dustmann et al. (2007) show that consistent with the polarization hypothesis,
occupations at the top of the wage distribution experienced the largest wage growth and
wage growth for the occupations in the middle of the wage distribution appears to be
smaller than wage growth at the bottom of the wage distribution.
There exists only a scarce literature on job complexity and several definitions of the
term coexist in the literature (Table 1 provides an overview of some recent studies). The
literature distinguishes objective and subjective measures of job complexity. Objective
measures rely on experts specifying job–complexity–categories and individuals being clas-
sified by their occupations, for example by the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT)
in the US (as used by Autor et al., 2003, and Sturman et al., 2005). The DOT charac-
terizes 12000 job titles and measures job complexity by ordinal rating scales. Subjective
measures of job complexity rely on self reported assessments by workers of the tasks
performed in their jobs (as used by Valentine, 2000, Van Der Vegt et al., 2000 or Spitz-
Oener, 2006). Ganzach and Pazy (2001) argue that an individual’s perception is a valid
measure for job complexity within occupation and that there exists a strongly positive
relationship between objective and subjective measures. The subjective measure is based
on responses to questions about the degree of the following seven job aspects: ’dealing
with others, autonomy, feedback, opportunities for establishing friendship, opportunities
to complete tasks, task identity and task variety.’ For our empirical analysis, we define
job complexity within a task–based approach to reflect the extent to which a job involves
4Note that Autor and Dorn (2008) find fairly high wage growth for low–skill service jobs in the US
suggesting a high degree of complementarity with high–skilled jobs.
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different tasks and to which a worker is expected to switch between different tasks.
What is the impact of job complexity on wages? Grossberg and Sicilian (1999) estimate
the relationship between on-the-job training, minimum wages, and wage growth. Job
complexity is a proxy for labor force attachment and measures the number of weeks which
an inexperienced new worker with the necessary education needs to be fully trained and
qualified. The study finds a positive relationship between job complexity and starting
wage. Job complexity shows a positive impact on on–the–job training which results in
further wage growth. Van Ophem et al. (1993) model occupational choice where the utility
of the worker depends positively upon the wage rate and negatively on job complexity.
Job complexity, job difficulty, and job level are classified by job analysts, i.e. these are
objective measures. The ordinal seven-stage scale (from level 1 = ’very simple labor,
requiring no consultation and which can be performed after a few days of experience’
to level 7 = ’applied work on a scientific basis or purely scientific work’) was produced
by the Dutch Department of Labor and includes the work content, required skills, and
the ability to acquire the necessary knowledge (see also Hartog and Vriend, 1990). In
the model of Van Ophem et al. (1993) the wage rate is positively correlated with job
complexity. The underlying assumption is that individuals request a compensation for
higher job complexity. Gavrel (2007) develops a matching model where firms optimally
choose job complexity. According to the model, the rise in unemployment could explain
both increasing job complexity as well as low wages and low employment rates of low-
skilled workers.
Our paper investigates recent changes in wage inequality in Germany for the time
period 1999 to 2006. The contribution of our paper is threefold. First, this is the first
study to analyze the most recent changes in wage inequality for full–time working males
in Germany using the task–based approach of Autor et al. (2003) and Spitz-Oener (2006).
Spitz-Oener (2006) uses the four waves of the ”Qualification and Occupational Career”
survey from the late 1970s to the late 1990s. A similar survey called ”Working-Population-
Survey” was redone in 2006 involving comparable task information. Our study here is the
first study to make simultaneous use of the 2006 and the 1999 survey. This is a partic-
ularly interesting time period because wage inequality has been increasing. Institutional
rigidities might have prevented an increase in wage inequality at the bottom of the wage
distribution in Germany until the mid 1990s and, thus, the task–based approach has only
been able to explain employment changes for this earlier time period (Spitz-Oener, 2006).
Thus, it is of interest to analyze as to whether a tasked–based approach may rational-
ize the changes in wage inequality during the most recent time period when institutions
did not prevent an increase in wage inequality at the bottom of the wage distribution in
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Germany. Furthermore, in response to the strong increase in unemployment Germany im-
plemented major labor market reforms to increase the work incentives of the unemployed
and to make labor market policy more effective (Fitzenberger, 2007) and unionization
rates have been falling (Fitzenberger et al., 2006; Dustmann et al., 2007).
Second, in addition to the task categories used by Spitz-Oener (2006) for Germany,
we also use two proxies for job complexity. Changing from routine to non-routine tasks
is likely to increase job complexity because workers have to perform different tasks si-
multaneously and the necessity to responding flexibly to changing demands at jobs has
increased. Thus, in addition to task assignments as defined by Autor et al. (2003) and
Spitz-Oener (2006), we also use two proxies for job complexity. The first proxy is a sum-
mary measure simply involving the number of tasks individuals perform. The second
proxy is a summary measure of the individuals responses to six questions regarding the
repetitiveness of the tasks performed at work. We suggest a different operationalization of
the five task categories used by Spitz-Oener (2006), which allows us to separately identify
the wage effects of task assignment in those five task categories from our two proxies for
job complexity.
Third, we perform a Blinder–Oaxaca type decomposition of the changes in the entire
wage distribution between 1999 and 2006 into the separate effects of personal character-
istics and task assignments. The decomposition is similar in spirit to a Machado and
Mata (2005) type decomposition for quantile regression. We operationalize such a de-
composition based on the estimation of heteroscedastic interval regressions for wages. In
estimating the counterfactual wage distribution for 1999 personal characteristics and 2006
task characteristics, we suggest an extension of the Fairlie (2005) approach.
Our main results are as follows. In line with the literature, we find a noticeable increase
of wage inequality between 1999 and 2006. The difference between the 80th and the 20th
percentile of log wages increases by around 8 percentage points. Wage inequality increases
by about the same extent both at the bottom and at the top of the wage distribution.
The decomposition results show that the changes in personal characteristics explain some
of the increase in wage inequality whereas the change in task assignments strongly works
towards reducing wage inequality. The coefficient effect for personal characteristics works
towards an increase in wage inequality at the top of the wage distribution. In contrast,
the coefficient effect for the task assignments shows an inverse U–shaped pattern, i.e.
the task coefficients change towards decreasing (increasing) wage inequality in the upper
(lower) part of the wage distribution. Altogether, we have to conclude that the task–based
approach can not explain the recent increase in wage inequality among male employees
in Germany. In fact, task assignments have changed towards reducing wage inequality
5
and the changes in task coefficients tend to reduce wage inequality at the top of the wage
distribution. The change in task coefficients has only contributed to the increase of wage
inequality at the bottom of the wage distribution. Only, the rise in wage inequality at the
bottom of the wage distribution can be rationalized by a low degree of complementarity
between low–wage jobs and high–wage jobs (Autor and Dorn, 2008).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data.
Section 3 discusses the estimation of heteroscedastic interval regressions for wages and
develops the approach to decompose the changes in the wage distribution. Section 4
presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. The appendix includes further infor-
mation on the data and detailed empirical results.
2 Data
The present study uses the BIBB/IAB Qualification and Occupational Career Survey5 for
19996 and the BIBB/BAuA Working-Population-Survey7 for 2006.8 The dataset includes
about 30,000 (20,000) respondents for the years 1999 (2006). The data include population
weights to undertake a representative analysis of all employees in Germany. The great
advantage of these data is that respondents are asked which tasks they actually carry out
as well as which skill–requirements are demanded in their jobs.
We restrict our analysis to full–time working male German citizens who are between 25
and 55 years old. Considering that the labor participation rate is high among this group,
we argue that the selection bias for employment/unemployment is rather small. This
leaves us with a sample of 9,420 observations for 1999 and a sample of 6,348 observations
for 2006, which includes employees and self–employed.
The data involve self–reported monthly earnings by intervals for the 1999 sample and
actual earnings for the 2006 sample. For the 2006 sample, if an individual decides not
to report earnings, that individual has the option to report when he/she earns above or
below e 1,500 per month. This concerns about 15% of all earnings observations and we
include this information in our subsequent analysis.
5In German: Qualifikation und Berufsverlauf. This survey is conducted by the German Federal Insti-
tute for Vocational Training (In German: Bundesinstitut fu¨r Berufsbildung, BIBB) and the Research In-
stitute of the Federal Employment Agency (In German: Institut fu¨r Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung).
6The study was carried out between 1998 and 1999. For simplicity, we refer to this two-year period
as 1999.
7In German: Erwerbsta¨tigenbefragung. This survey is conducted by the German Federal Institute
for Vocational Training (In German: Bundesinstitut fu¨r Berufsbildung, BIBB) and the Federal Institute
for Occupational Safety and Health (In German: Bundesanstalt fu¨r Arbeitsschutz und Arbeitsmedizin,
BAuA).
8The study was carried out between 2005 and 2006. For simplicity, we refer to this two-year period
as 2006.
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As personal characteristics, we distinguish workers by age9 and by the three skill
categories10:
low–skilled: without a vocational training degree
medium–skilled: with a vocational training degree (”Berufsausbildung”)
high–skilled: with a degree from a University (”Hochschule”) or a Univer-
sity of the Applied Sciences (”Fachhochschule”)
We remark that skill upgrading seems to have taken place during that period: While the
part of the low-skilled workers shrank from 9% to 5%, the share of high-skilled workers
rose by 4 ppoints to 22% in 2006. Hence, the share of medium–skilled workers remained
stable at about 73%.
Furthermore, we define dummy variables variables for 20 different occupations, based
on the list of 33 ocupations provided by the Federal Statistical office11, (see Statistisches
Bundesamt, 1992), which are described in Table 2.
To operationalize the task categories, we follow Spitz-Oener (2006) as closely as possi-
ble12 and aggregate13 the 14 different tasks reported in the data to the five task measures
suggested by Autor et al. (2003) (see Table 5 for the aggregation). The five task measures
(indexed by j) are j = 1: non-routine analytic tasks, j = 2: non-routine interactive tasks, j
= 3: routine cognitive tasks, j = 4: routine manual tasks, and j = 5: non-routine manual
tasks14. The task measures are calculated for individual i in cross-section t.
For our empirical analysis, we use two alternative definitions for the task indices. The
first task–index is the definition used by Spitz-Oener (2006), henceforth SO–Task–Index,
which is given by
SOijt =
number of activities in category j performed by i in cross section t
total number of activities in category j at time t
(1)
This definition measures the share of activities (tasks) a worker reports to perform
among all activities (tasks) of type j. This definition mixes the distribution of time a
worker spends on each task with the total number of tasks performed. Since the latter
9Pointwise estimates indicate that the working population has aged from 40 years in 1999 to 42 years
2006 on average.
10In order to make our study comparable to the existing literature we decide to implement the prevalant
education categories.
11In German: Statistisches Bundesamt.
12The distribution of the tasks proposed by Spitz-Oener (2006), who uses the first four available
BIBB/IAB surveys until 1999 differs slightly from ours. These differences are due to the fact that
some tasks reported in the past do not exist any more in the data used here.
13Note that aggregation of the single task categories helps to reduce possible measurement error and
allows at the same time to capture the main structure of the tasks carried out by the individuals.
14Playing around with the categorization of the tasks in an economically meaningful sense reveals that
our results are robust towards changes in the categorization.
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reflects job complexity, we would like to distinguish these two aspects. Therefore, we
propose an alternative definition of the task–index, henceforth AFL–Task–Index,15 which
measures the distribution of tasks reported in the five task categories. This AFL–Task–
Index is given by
AFLijt =
number of activities in category j performed by i in cross section t
total number of activities performed by i over all categories at time t
(2)
Our new task–index gives the share of reported tasks in category j among all categories
reported by worker i. We take this as an approximation of the share of working time this
worker uses to perform tasks in category j. In contrast to the SO–Task-Indices, the AFL–
Task–Indices sum up to one for each individual and therefore one index has to be omitted
as covariate in a regression with an intercept.
Tables 6 and 7 show the distribution of the two different definitions of the task indices,
the SO–Task–Index and the AFL–Task–Index, respectively, for the two survey years. We
find remarkable changes in the two task indices between 1999 and 2006. The SO–Task–
Index indicates that the non-routine analytic and routine cognitive task indices increase
by 12.2 and 8.8 ppoints, respectively, whereas the task indices for non-routine interactive
(-1 ppoint), routine manual (-5.4 ppoints) and non-routine manual (-7.9 ppoints) decline.
Furthermore, the SO–Task–Index shows that for the low–skilled worker a rise in non-
routine analytic and routine cognitive tasks took place, while the non-routine manual
tasks decline. For high-skilled workers, we find an increase of non-routine analytic tasks
and a large decrease of non-routine manual tasks. The impact of the non-routine manual
tasks is unchanged for the low–skilled workers, whereas these tasks in the med skilled
group also decreased. For the med–skilled worker have the routine cognitive task the
largest impact, which also increased since 1999. Furthermore, the non-routine analytic
tasks documented a rise in the med–skilled group, too. Overall, the largest changes of
the SO–Task–Index are the rise of non-routine-analytic tasks in all skilled groups and
the decreasing of non-routine manual tasks in the high–skilled group. The AFL–Task–
Index indicates similar changes but the decline of routine manual tasks is stronger than
the decline of non-routine manual tasks. For the low–skilled, it is observed that routine
manual tasks strongly decrease. In contrast to the SO–Task–Index one can find a higher
increase of the non-routine analytic task in the high–skilled than in the low–skilled group.
Remarkable regarding the described development of the tasks is the contrast to the task-
based framework or rather the changes of the tasks from 1979 until 1999, detailed described
in Spitz-Oener (2006). Autor et al. (2003) and Spitz-Oener (2006) determined a large
15AFL stands for the first letters of the authors’ surnames and is not to be confounded with any US
union organization or sports organization.
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increase in jobs involving non-routine manual tasks and our data shows a large decrease
of non-routine manual tasks between 1999 and 2006. Furthermore Spitz-Oener (2006)
showed, that routine cognitive tasks strongly decreased until 1999, whereas our results
documenting an increase of these tasks from 1999 until 2006. This discovered opposing
trend in the development of the routine cognitive and non-routine manual task categories
is very notable. Furthermore the non-routine analytic (increase) and the routine manual
(decrease) categories stay in trend. The increasing development of non-routine interactive
tasks came to a stop.
The SO–Task–Index implicitly takes account of job complexity regarding the number
of tasks performed. If the number of tasks increases then the sum of the SO–Task–Indices
across the five categories grows as well. However, this increase is weighted by the total
number of tasks in category j. To account for job complexity when using our AFL–Task–
Index, we define NJC as the total number of activities (tasks) reported by a worker and
use NJC as a measure for job complexity. Note that NJC corresponds to the denominator
in equation (7).
As a second indicator of subjective job complexity, we define the variable SJC which
contains information about how workers rate their job requirements. Specifically, workers
are asked, (i) if the procedures they carry out in their job are described in detail, (ii) if
the procedures in their job are very often of the same nature, (iii) if it happens regularly
that new tasks are posed which have to be thought through beforehand, (iv) if existing
procedures in their jobs have to be improved, (v) if things are demanded the individual
has not been trained in and (vi) if it is demanded that different tasks are to be carried
out at the same time. The individual either may respond that this is always or often the
case or that this is rather seldom. Hence we create binary variables taking the values 1
in the former case and 0 otherwise. Individuals who respond affirmatively to the first two
questions hold rather monotone jobs compared to respondents who respond affirmatively
to questions three to six.16 We define dummy variables for affirmative answers (combining
the categories always and often) to the six questions on job requirements which we denote
by jr1 to jr6. Then, our subjective indicator for job complexity SJC is defined by
SJCi = (−1)jr1 + (−1)jr2 + jr3 + jr4 + jr5 + jr6(3)
which sums up the number of affirmative answers for questions 3 to 6 and subtracts the
number of affirmative answers to questions 1 and 2. The higher the value of SJC, the less
monotone the worker views his job.
16A simple correlation analysis reveals that the first two are positively correlated with each other and
negatively correlated with the last four questions. Again the last four question show positively correlated
answers. Note again that the aggregation helps to diminish possible measurement error.
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Table 8 reports the descriptive statistics for SJC. As to be expected, SJC increases
with the skill level. Between 1999 and 2006, SJC increases and the increase is strongest
for low–skilled workers. Table 9 sums up the descriptive statistics for NJC. Qualitively
NJC and SJC show the same movements between 1999 and 2006, with the exception
that NJC actually falls for the high-skilled workers. The reason for this exception is
probably, that the high-skilled already reached a high degree of complexity, so that there
only a marginal rise, but also little variation downwards within a high complexity degree
is thinkable. The potential to increase the complexity degree of the job is certainly higher
in low–skilled jobs. Furthermore technical improvements, which reduced the working time
for manufacturing processes and therefore allows to do more things in same time, you can
mainly find in low–skilled jobs.
As one additional specific task variable, we use the dummy variable PC-use, which
indicates whether a person uses a personal computer in his job on a regular basis. It is
often argued that skilled biased technical change has affected the workplace most strongly
through the use of computers, see Autor et al. (2003).
3 Econometric Approach
We estimate a location scale model for wages where both the mean log wage and the
variance of log wages depends upon observed covariates. This is similar in spirit to esti-
mating quantile regressions of wages allowing for wage dispersion to differ by covariates.
Because all wages in 1999 and some of the wage information in 2006 involve only inter-
val information, we estimate heteroscedastic interval regressions for wages. We use our
model estimates to simulate both the actual, unobserved wage distributions and counter-
factual wage distributions to perform a Blinder–Oaxaca–type decomposition analysis of
the changes in the wage structure between 1999 and 2006, similar in spirit to a Machado
and Mata (2005) type decomposition for quantile regression. Our decomposition analysis
distinguishes the contribution of personal characteristics P from the contribution of task
variables T . We suggest to model the link between the two sets of variables explicitly
when estimating the counterfactual distribution of wages when personal characteristics
are taken from one year and task variables are taken from another year. Our approach
extends upon the Fairlie (1999) and Fairlie (2005) decomposition analysis for nonlinear
estimation problems. We emphasize that a credible decomposition analysis has to account
for the link between the two sets of variables and that this requires that the researcher
has to be very specific when defining the counterfactuals. In the decomposition analysis,
we specifically address the question what would have been the wage structure in 2006 if
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we still had the 1999 sample of workers but if some or all labor market conditions are as
in 2006. This question motivates our particular choice of the sequence of counterfactuals.
3.1 Estimated Model
We specify the log hourly wage log(wi) of individual i to be normally distributed where
both mean and variance depend upon the observed covariates Xi = (Pi, Ti) comprising
personal characteristics Pi and task variables Ti. Specifically, we assume
log(wi) = β0 +X
′
iβ1 + σi · ǫi(4)
where the random variable ǫi is independent across observations i and it is assumed
to follow a standard normal distribution. The expectation of log wages conditional on Xi
is given by E(log(wi)|Xi) = β0 +X
′
iβ1. We allow the conditional wage dispersion to vary
with observed covariates by specifying the log standard deviation as a linear function of
covariates Xi√
V ar(log(wi)|Xi) ≡ log(σi) = γ0 +X
′
iγ1 .(5)
We estimate the parameters of the wage model β = (β0, β1) and γ = (γ0, γ1) by Max-
imum Likelihood taking account of the fact that we may only have the information that
the individual wage lies in some interval whose endpoints differ by observation i. Basi-
cally, we estimate a heteroscedastic interval regression allowing for some observations with
exact wage information. Moreover, we use population weights gi for weighted estimation
provided by the data.
Define the indicator function Ii = 1 if only internal information on wages is available
and Ii = 0 if the actual wage is observed. When Ii = 1, we only know that wi lies in
the interval [ai, bi]. ai = 0 represents the case where we only observe some upper bound
bi < ∞ for the wage. bi = ∞ represents the case where we only observe some positive
lower bound ai > 0 for the wage. Even though there are fixed earnings intervals reported
in the data, the intervals [ai, bi] for hourly wage wi have index i because the individuals
differ in their reported hours of work.
To estimate the model parameters (β, γ), our maximum likelihood estimator maxi-
mizes the weighted sum
∑
i gi log(Li) where the individual contributions to the likelihood
function are given by
Li =
[
1
σi
ϕ
(
log(wi)− β0 −X
′
iβ
σi
)]Ii=0
(6)
·
[
Φ
(
log(bi)− β0 −X
′
iβ
σi
)
− Φ
(
log(ai)− β0 −X
′
iβ
σi
)]Ii=1
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where σi = exp(γ0 +X
′
iγ1) and gi are the population weights provided by the data. By
abuse of notation for the limit case bi →∞ and ai = 0, we take the first term in brackets
in the second line (for the case I1 = 1) to be equal to one for bi =∞ (no upper bound of
wage interval). Analogously for ai = 0, we take the second term to be equal to zero for
ai = 0 (no lower bound of wage interval).
Note that the interval regression commands in econometric software packages such as
TSP or Stata do not simultaneously allow for the combination of weighting, heteroscedas-
ticity, and some of the wages not being interval coded. Therefore, we programmed the
estimator in TSP.
3.2 Simulation and Decomposition
Based on our estimates for the model parameters, we are able estimate the unobserved
actual unconditional wage distribution of log(wi) using a simulation approach. This ap-
proach is also being applied in order to estimate the counterfactual distribution used in
our subsequent decomposition analysis. Analogous to a Machado and Mata (2005) simu-
lation of the unconditional wage distribution based on quantile regression estimates, we
draw a random ǫi for each observation i from a standard normal distribution and use
the estimated parameters (βˆ, γˆ) replacing the true parameters to simulate a wage sample
w∗i according to equation (4). Then, we calculate empirical quantiles qθ of the weighted
distribution of simulated wages using weights gi at the 19 quantiles θ = .05, .1, .15, ..., .95.
In our application it turns out, that there is a sizeable simulation error in doing so.17
Therefore, we simulate 10 samples for each case and then take the average of the 10
corresponding quantile estimates as our estimates for the unconditional distribution of
wages.
We estimate the unconditional wage distribution both for the 1999 and the 2006 sam-
ples using model parameters α99 = (βˆ99, γˆ99) and α06 = (βˆ06, γˆ06), respectively, obtained
separately for the two years.18 We denote the quantiles for the two distributions by
q99θ (P
99, T 99, α99
0
, α99
1,P , α
99
1,T ) and q
06
θ (P
06, T 06, α06
0
, α06
1,P , α
06
1,T )(7)
respectively. This involved notation is key to develop the separate steps in our decom-
position analysis below. The superscript j = 99, 06 in qjθ(.) reflects the sample and the
weights used for simulation. The first two arguments P j, T j indicate which sample of
personal (P) and task (T) characteristics are used for the simulation. The arguments
17Note that one simulation of a wage distribution is just one sample draw in a simulation based on our
estimated model for our initial sample.
18To simplify the notation, we omit the hats for the α’s even though these are estimates.
12
α
j
0
, α
j
1,P , α
j
1,T denote the sets of coefficients used in the simulation for the intercepts, the
slope coefficients for the personal characteristics, and the slope coefficients for the task
characteristics, respectively. Note that each argument comprises both the coefficients for
the mean β and the standard deviation γ.
To investigate the change in the wage distribution between 1999 and 2006, we analyze
the quantiles differences
∆
06/99
θ = q
06
θ (P
06, T 06, α06
0
, α06
1,P , α
06
1,T )− q
99
θ (P
99, T 99, α99
0
, α99
1,P , α
99
1,T )
Our decomposition analysis will separately analyze the contribution of each of the five
arguments of the simulated quantiles to statistically explain ∆
06/99
θ . We normalize all
covariates used for the estimation by using deviations from their corresponding weighted
average in 1999. This allows a meaningful decomposition of the impact of the different
sets of covariates and the aggregate trends given by the changes in the intercepts. Note
that this normalization corresponds to a particular sequence of counterfactuals wage dis-
tribution.
The particular sequence of counterfactuals we analyze starts by addressing the ques-
tion what would be the wage distribution if we had the 1999 sample of individuals with
their personal characteristics, we assigned them tasks as in 2006, and we rewarded their
characteristics as in 2006 (i.e. we use 2006 coefficients). This tells us the wage distribution
in 2006 had we still the 1999 individuals being exposed to the 2006 labor market. The
second counterfactual involves the 1999 individuals and task assignment being rewarded
as in 2006. To decompose the coefficient effect of personal characteristics from tasks, we
normalize all regressors around their 1999 weighted means and first analyze as third coun-
terfactual the wage distribution implied by 1999 intercepts and 2006 slope coefficients.
This allows to separate the general trend in the wage distribution from the effects of
the slope coefficients. The fourth counterfactual changes to 1999 coefficients of personal
characteristics and the 1999 wage distribution finally also involves the 1999 coefficients of
tasks.
Formally, the decomposition ∆
06/99
θ into five components works as follows. The first
two decomposition terms involve the characteristic effects regarding the contribution of
the changes in personal characteristics and task characteristics. The remaining three
concern the coefficient effects for the intercepts, the personal characteristics, and the
task characteristics. Our decomposition proceeds by the sequence of arguments in the
simulated quantiles in equation (7). For each simulation of counterfactuals, we again take
the averages of the quantiles over 10 simulations.
The first component ∆1θ involves the effect of the changes in personal characteristics
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and is defined by
∆1θ = q
06
θ (P
06, T 06, α06
0
, α06
1,P , α
06
1,T )− q
99
θ (P
99, T 06, α06
0
, α06
1,P , α
06
1,T )
The second term involves the counterfactual wage distribution for the 1999 sample of
individuals using 1999 weights (superscript 99) with the 1999 distribution of personal
characteristics P 99. This counterfactual should give us the wage distribution for the 1999
sample of individuals with their personal characteristics had they been assigned the 2006
task distribution and did the 2006 coefficients apply. The operationalization of this in-
tuitive definition is not straight forward. For a similar nonlinear decomposition problem,
Fairlie (2005) discusses to assign the counterfactual task characteristics randomly (im-
plicitly assuming independence between the different sets of characteristics) or based on
the rank in the distribution of predicted outcomes. We think both strategies suffer from
not taking account of the relationship between personal characteristics and task assign-
ments. Thus, we suggest and use an alternative approach building on our interest in the
counterfactual situation of a person in the 1999 sample when this person is assigned the
2006 tasks according to the way the labor market in 2006 works. To operationalize this
notion, we estimate probits regressing the task dummy variables on personal characteris-
tics for the 2006 sample mimicking the task assignment in 2006. We use these estimates
to simulate the task assignment for our counterfactual by adding a random error term for
each individual to the fitted latent variables and then determine the sign.19
The second component ∆2θ involves the effect of the changes in task assignments and
is defined by
∆2θ = q
99
θ (P
99, T 06, α06
0
, α06
1,P , α
06
1,T )− q
99
θ (P
99, T 99, α06
0
, α06
1,P , α
06
1,T )
where the first term is the counterfactual used to define the first component and the
second term involves the counterfactual wage distribution for the actual 1999 sample of
individuals using both the personal characteristics P 99 and the task assignment T 99. The
sum ∆1θ+∆
2
θ involves the full characteristics effect in a Blinder–Oaxaca type decomposition
where the differences in characteristics is evaluated at 2006 coefficients.
The third component ∆3θ involves the effect of the changes in the intercepts, i.e. the
changes in the conditional expectation and the conditional variance for those individuals
with average 1999 characteristics. This is defined by
∆3θ = q
99
θ (P
99, T 99, α06
0
, α06
1,P , α
06
1,T )− q
99
θ (P
99, T 99, α99
0
, α06
1,P , α
06
1,T )
19Heinze (2008) uses a conceptually similar idea to decompose the gender wage gap into the components
associated with personal characteristics and the components associated with firm characteristics. To
construct the counterfactual with female personal characteristics and male firm characteristics, she uses
nearest neighbor matching to assign the most similar male worker to a female worker in terms of her
personal characteristics and then uses the firm characteristics of this matched male worker.
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We interpret ∆3θ as the residual change (time trend) in the wage distribution which is
unexplained by changes in characteristics or slope coefficients.
The fourth component ∆4θ reflects the change in the coefficients of personal character-
istics and is defined by
∆4θ = q
99
θ (P
99, T 99, α99
0
, α06
1,P , α
06
1,T )− q
99
θ (P
99, T 99, α99
0
, α99
1,P , α
06
1,T )
The last component ∆5θ reflects the change in the coefficients of task characteristics
and is defined by
∆5θ = q
99
θ (P
99, T 99, α99
0
, α99
1,P , α
06
1,T )− q
99
θ (P
99, T 99, α99
0
, α99
1,P , α
99
1,T )
The sum ∆3θ + ∆
4
θ + ∆
5
θ involves the full coefficient effect in a Blinder–Oaxaca type
decomposition where the differences in coefficients is evaluated at 1999 characteristics
coefficients.
The overall decomposition of the changes in the wage distribution between 1999 and
2006 can be summarized as
∆
06/99
θ = ∆
1
θ︸︷︷︸
Personal
+ ∆2θ︸︷︷︸
Task︸ ︷︷ ︸
Characteristics
+ ∆3θ︸︷︷︸
Residual
effect
+ ∆4θ︸︷︷︸
Personal
+ ∆5θ︸︷︷︸
Task︸ ︷︷ ︸
Coefficients
Note that our definition of counterfactuals focuses on the 1999 sample of individuals
defined by their personal characteristics and their sample weights. Consequently, we also
used the same simulated value of the random variable ǫi for all simulations in one run of
the 10 simulations involved.
We report bootstrap standard errors on our decomposition estimates which take ac-
count of the sample variability of the estimated model parameters. To do so, we imple-
ment a parametric bootstrap and resample the model coefficients from their estimated
asymptotic distribution estimated by maximum likelihood.
4 Results
We analyze the change in the distribution of hourly wages for full–time working males
between 1999 and 2006. To present our empirical results, we proceed in three steps.
First, we describe the changes in the wage distribution. Second, we present our estimated
heteroscedastic interval regressions for wages. Third, we use our regression estimates to
decompose the changes in the wage distribution. Our regression results are of descriptive
nature as we only control for observable characteristics, i.e. we do not claim to estimate
causal effects.
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4.1 Descriptive Evidence
To analyze the changes in inequality of hourly wages among full–time working males,
we analyze percentile differences in log wages, namely the 80-20, the 80-50, and the 50-
20 differences.20 The 80-20 difference is a measure of overall wage inequality, while the
80-50 and 50-20 differences reflect wage inequality at the top and at the bottom of the
distribution, respectively.21
For the descriptive results in this section, we first impute the midpoints of the earnings
interval that is given by the respondent for the survey carried out in 1999 and we use the
actual earnings reported in 2006.22 These earnings data are divided by reported hours23
to obtain hourly wages. Then, we calculate the 20% quantile, the median and the 80%
quantile of log hourly wages and report the differences between these quantiles. Note that
we tend to underestimate wage inequality in both years because for 1999 the earnings data
are interval coded and for 2006 we ignore those 15% of the respondents who do not report
their actual earnings and who are likely to have fairly high earnings (see footnote 22).
Table 3 provides the inequality measures for both years. The overall 80-20 difference in
1999 is .57 and it increases to .64 in 2006, i.e. we observe an increase by 7 log ppoints. The
increase in the upper part (80-50) amounts to 5 log ppoints (.34-.29) and in the lower part
(50-20) to 2 log ppoints (.30-.28). For the reasons discussed above, these numbers may
differ from our subsequent simulation results discussed in section 4.3. Figure 1 provides
kernel-density estimates of the wage distribution. It shows that in 2006 the distribution
is flatter and more dispersed than in 1999.
Wage inequality differs by skill level (low, medium, high). Whereas wage inequality
among medium–skilled workers has remained stable over time, wage inequality among
low–skilled and high–skilled workers has increased. Specifically, low-skilled workers expe-
rienced a strong increase in wage inequality: we find evidence of an overall change of 16
log ppoints which is mainly driven by an increase of 14 log ppoints at the top of wage
distribution. High-skilled workers experienced a rise in overall wage inequality of 4 log
20For our analysis only full-time working men are taken into account that are between 25 and 55 years
old, whereas working full-time is defined as working more than 25 hours per week. Furthermore, only
German citizens employed in West Germany are considered. Finally individuals that respond that they
work more than 71 hours per week are excluded from the analysis, as we consider this answer as not
being reasonable.
21We focus here on the 20%, 50%, and 80% quantiles as being respresentative for the wage distribution.
The simulation results in section 4.3 provides more detailed graphical evidence, which is likely to be more
reliable for reasons discussed below. Note that the statistical uncertainty increases at more extreme
quantiles.
22About 15% of the respondents in the survey carried out in 2006 only respond whether their gross
monthly earnings is below or above e1500 and 90% in this group report it to be above. As we cannot
impute reasonable values for these individuals, they are excluded in this descriptive part.
23Over 90% of the respondents state that they work between 35h and 55h per week.
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ppoints percentage points which is associated with a similar increase in inequality both
at the bottom and at the top of the wage distribution.
4.2 Parameter Estimates
Table 10 to Table 17 provide the different parameter estimates of the heteroscedastic
interval regressions for log wages. The upper part of the tables shows the parameter
estimates for the conditional expectations (mean log wages) and the lower part shows the
parameter estimates for heteroscedasticity. We have estimated four different specifications
for each of the two survey years resulting in eight separate estimates reported. The
specifications differ as to whether we used the AFL–Task–Indices or the SO–Task–Indices
(see section 2) and as to whether occupations are used as additional covariates in the
regression. In the following, we treat occupation as part of the personal characteristics to
separate the reported occupation from the reported task information.
Table 10 and Table 11 contain the parameter estimates for the two years 1999 and
2006 without occupations and our proposed AFL–Task–Indices (AFL1-AFL4). These
specifications also include the covariate NJC (sum of reported tasks) as one measure
for job complexity. It is notable that the estimated parameter in the heteroscedasticity
part for computer use shifts from about -.02 and being insignificant to -.09 in the second
survey and now being highly significant. This can be interpreted as a wage smoothing
effect of computer use. Using a computer also seems to be associated with higher average
wages in 2006 than in 1999, as the parameter estimates grow over time (.15 versus .12).
Considering the estimated parameters of AFL-Task–Indices,24 we observe that for this first
specification all of them are less rewarded in 2006 than during the first period. While the
data of the 1999 survey yields positive and significant values for all estimates of our task-
measures, they drop dramatically in 2006. The measures for routine cognitive (AFL3) and
routine manual (AFL4) tasks become even negative, though not being significant anymore.
The objective measure for job complexity (NJC ) also seems to have a negative but not
significant effect on wages, whereas the positive coefficient of subjective job complexity
(SJC ) increases over time, though not significantly so.
We now compare the specification using our AFL–Task–Indices without conditioning
on the different occupations with the specification conditioning on occupations, for which
the results are shown in Table 12 and Table 13.25 The large positive effect of computer use
is captured to a large extent by the occupations. To our surprise, the coefficient estimates
for the AFL–Task–Indices change only to a small extent compared to the specification
24The category non-routine manual is the left-out category
25Occupational category 13 Painter, vanisher, unskilled worker is the left-out category.
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without occupation and we see similar changes in these coefficients over time. The es-
timated effects of NJC are basically not affected by conditioning on occupations. SJC
still shows a positive effect on wages even after conditioning on occupations but its effect
is reduced. Overall, our results suggest that a large part of the information in the task
variables is not captured by occupations.
Comparing the specifications using the AFL–Task–Indices with the specifications us-
ing the SO–Task–Indices proposed by Spitz-Oener (2006) (SO1-SO5), we find that the
estimates for the personal characteristics do not differ much. This indicates the robust-
ness of our model to employing the task–indices proposed by Spitz-Oener (2006) and
our task–indices. However, our approach allows to separately estimate the effects of job
complexity as measured by NJC.
Regarding the specification without occupations the parameter estimates for the SO–
indices suggest that carrying out non–routine analytic tasks and non–routine interactive
tasks is better rewarded in 2006 than in 1999, whereas routine tasks are less rewarded.
This result is not robust against considering occupations though, since for this speci-
fication the estimates suggest that all tasks but the non–routine manual tasks are less
rewarded in 2006 than in 1999. This finding may indicate an additional advantage of
our proposed measure, since the results are robust for the specifications using the AFL–
indices.
Low-skilled and high-skilled26 workers are likely to experience quite different life-cycle
profiles in wages. Results in Antonczyk (2007), Fitzenberger (1999), and Dustmann et al.
(2007) support this hypothesis. Therefore, we interact our indicator variables for low-
skilled and high-skilled workers with the variables age and age2. The parameter estimates
for these interaction terms show significant differences between medium–skilled and high–
skilled workers whereas the age profile do not differ significantly between low–skilled and
medium–skilled workers. The age profiles for high–skilled workers prove steeper than
those for the other two skill groups.
For all specifications the results indicate that age shows less of a wage smoothing effect
in 2006 than in 1999. Moreover the estimates show that being low–skilled or high–skilled
in 2006 results in a higher wage dispersion in 2006 than in 1999, which is in line with what
was shown by the unconditional descriptive statistics. Finally the parameter estimates for
the measures of job complexity indicate that wage dispersion is positively correlated with
the number of tasks carried out and this effect is rather stable for the two observed years.
Subjective job complexity seems to become more ”wage–smoothing” over the periods,
these results are not always significant though.
26Medium–skilled workers are our left-out category.
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4.3 Decomposition Results
Our decomposition results are depicted in Figures 2 to 527 which show overall wage growth
between 1999 and 2006 by the quantiles of the unconditional wage distribution and the
decomposition of wage growth according to the approach outlined in section 3.2. The
changes of our measures for wage inequality between 1999 and 2006 are depicted with
95%–confidence bands.28 In addition to the graphical evidence, Tables 18 to 21 provide
specific numbers for the decomposition of the 80–20, 80-50, and 50-20 quantile differences.
Depending on the specification employed we measure an increase of the overall wage
dispersion, measured as the 80-20 difference ranging between 7.7 and 8.5 log ppoints.
These differences reflect the possible estimation and specification error for the different
estimated model. In contrast to the results reported in section 4.1, Tables 18 to 21 show
that the increase in wage inequality in the lower part of the distribution (50-20) is slightly
higher (4.2 to 4.6 log ppoints) than the increase in the upper part (3.2 to 3.9 log ppoints).
Because the results reported in section 4.1 do not use the full variation of the data, we
put more trust in the range of values obtained by our simulation approach. Thus, we
conclude that the increase in wage inequality at the bottom of the distribution has been
at least as large as at the top of the distribution.
We now discuss the results of our decomposition analysis. The changes in the personal
characteristics (Char. P) contribute about 2-3 log ppoints to the increase in the 80-20
differential. Controlling for occupation as part of the personal characteristics somewhat
reduces these figures, i.e. the change in occupation has slightly worked against an increase
in inequality. The contribution of personal characteristics is larger at the top of the wage
distribution (the figures for 80-50 are larger than for 50-20) and this difference is more
pronounced in the model with occupations.
The contribution of changes in the task characteristics (Char. T ) works in opposite
direction, i.e. the changes in tasks work towards reducing wage inequality. This effect is
almost uniform across the wage distribution (Figures 2 to 5), i.e. it works both towards
reducing inequality at the bottom and at the top of the distribution. All reported effects
are highly significant. The changes in the task characteristics work towards a reduction
of the 80-20 differential by 3.3-4.1 log ppoints. The effect is reduced in absolute value
when controlling for occupations which corresponds to the observation above that the
positive effect on inequality of changes in the personal characteristics is mitigated when
occupations are controlled for.
The coefficient effect of the personal characteristics (Coef. P) clearly contributes to
27Note that we use different domains for the vertical axis in order to better display the results.
28We employ a parametric bootstrap with 500 repetitions for inference.
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the rising wage inequality at the top of the wage distribution: the effect – measured by
changes in the 80-50 differential - ranges from 1 to 1.5 log ppoints. The effect in the
lower part is only significant – and only marginally so – for the specification using the
SO–Task–Indices together with occupations where it amounts to .8 log ppoints.
The task coefficient effect (Coef. T ) shows a significant inverted U–shape. This in-
dicates that this coefficient effect works towards lower inequality at the top of the wage
distribution and towards higher inequality at the bottom of the wage distribution. The
significant point estimates for the different specifications lie between 1 and 1.6 log ppoints
for the lower part and between -1.5 and -.9 log ppoints in the upper part. If task coefficient
are interpreted as prices (rewards for performing such tasks in terms of higher wages),
the polarization hypothesis of Goos and Manning (2007) would predict a U–shaped pat-
tern with wages both at the top and at the bottom of the distribution growing relative
to the middle of the distribution because of increasing demands for tasks in both tails.
However, as pointed out in the introduction, the model of Autor and Dorn (2008) can
rationalize increasing wage dispersion at the bottom of the wage distribution in light of
the polarization hypothesis by a low degree of complementarity between low–wage jobs
and high–wage jobs.
Even though there are significant contributions of the substantive coefficient effects
discussed above and the characteristics effects, the unexplained component (i.e. the effect
of the changes in intercepts when we define covariates as deviations from their 1999
means, see section 3) is about the same as the overall change in the wage distribution.
This holds almost exactly for the models not controlling for occupations. The unexplained
component is somewhat reduced (especially for the 50-20 differential) when we control for
occupations.
5 Conclusions
This paper provides an empirical analysis of recent changes in the German wage structure
for the time period 1999 to 2006. We analyze the changes in wage inequality for full–time
working males in Germany using a task–based approach similar to Autor et al. (2003) and
Spitz-Oener (2006). The results are based on more recent survey data for Germany than
used by Spitz-Oener (2006), who builds on the data until 1999. In addition to the task
categories used by Spitz-Oener (2006) for Germany, we also use two proxies for job com-
plexity. Furthermore, we perform a Blinder–Oaxaca type decomposition of the changes in
the entire wage distribution between 1999 and 2006 into the separate effects of personal
characteristics and task assignments. We operationalize such a decomposition based on
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the estimation of heteroscedastic interval regressions for wages. In estimating the counter-
factual wage distribution for 1999 personal characteristics and 2006 task characteristics,
we suggest an extension of the Fairlie (2005) approach.
In line with the literature, our paper finds a noticeable increase of wage inequality
between 1999 and 2006. The difference between the 80th and the 20th percentile of
log wages increases by around 8 percentage points, with the increase being about the
same both at the bottom and at the top of the wage distribution. The decomposition
results show that the changes in personal characteristics explain some of the increase in
wage inequality, whereas the changes in task assignments and occupations strongly work
towards reducing wage inequality. The coefficient effect for personal characteristics works
towards an increase in wage inequality at the top of the wage distribution. In contrast,
the coefficient effect for the task assignments shows an inverted U–shaped pattern, i.e. the
task coefficients change towards reducing (increasing) wage inequality at the top (bottom)
of the wage distribution.
Overall, we have to conclude that the task–based approach can not explain the recent
increase in wage inequality among male employees in Germany. Only at the bottom
of the wage distribution, the change in task coefficients has contributed to the increase
in wage inequality. Thus, wages for the tasks demanded in low wage jobs have fallen
disproportionately over time. This finding confirms the assessment in Goos and Manning
(2007) (sections VII–VIII) that the polarization hypothesis derived from the task–based
approach of Autor et al. (2003) can not explain the rising wage inequality at the bottom
of the wage distribution - except for the small part of the rise in wage inequality at
the bottom, which can be attributed to the task coefficient effect. The latter can be
rationalized in light of the polarization hypothesis by a low degree of complementarity
between low–wage jobs and high–wage jobs (Autor and Dorn, 2008). Furthermore, our
findings suggest to analyze the impact of institutional changes, such as deunionization
(see Dustmann et al., 2007) and the labor market reforms, as potential explanations for
the recent increase in wage inequality.
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Appendix
Table 1: Definition of Job Complexity - Short Overview
Study Object of
Investiga-
tion
Data Definition of Job Complexity
Pekkarinen
and Var-
tiainen
(2004)
Gender dif-
ferences in
the alloca-
tion of jobs
in respect
to the job
complexity
Panel data of
Finnish met-
alworkers
(Confed-
eration of
Finnish In-
dustry and
Employers,
1990-2000)
J.C. is measured with a grading system and the com-
plexity rating of the job-aspects was generated by some
experts. They estimate three criteria of job complex-
ity: 1)the duration to learn the tasks 2)degree of re-
sponsibility 3)working conditions. Based on the grad-
ing of the job a accordingly wage for each job was
estimated. The higher the demand the higher the
occupation-related wage, which is then the variable to
measure job complexity and a job ladder was gener-
ated.
Fried et al.
(2002)
Joint effect
of noise, job
complexity,
and gender
on employee
sickness
absence.
Cordis (Car-
diovascular
Occupa-
tional Risk
Factors
Determi-
nation in
Israel) study
(1985-1987)
J.C. is the average of estimated values for task com-
plexity (amount of elements, decisions, independence,
sophistication and skill level at the job) and task va-
riety of the employee´s job through three independent
experts. Both items are measured with a 4-point scale
with 1 indicating a very simple job and 4 implying a
very complex job and no job diversity till much diver-
sity respectively.
Valentine
(2000)
The relation-
ship between
job com-
plexity and
intention
to look for
work, gender
and race
National
Longitudinal
Survey of
Youth (US
Department
of Labor,
1982)
J.C. is measured with using a reduced form of the ”Job
Characteristics of Inventory” (developed by Sims et al.,
1976). The JCI measures an individuals rating in the
following five dimensions (three items each): Skill Va-
riety (extent of skill requirement), Task Identity (com-
plete a work from start to finish), Task Significance
(subjective estimation of the importance of the work),
Autonomy and Job Feedback. The values of these five-
scales are averaged by Valentine to get a index for (sub-
jective) J.C..
Van
Der Vegt
et al.
(2000)
Effect from
J.C. on
individual
job/ team
satisfaction,
job/ team
commitment
114 em-
ployers at
a technical
consulting
firm
Using a modified version of the Job Diagnostic Survey
with three items for each of the four dimensions: Skill
Variety, Task Significance, Task Identity and Auton-
omy. A overall job complexity scale is produced with
the subjective belief of individuals for each category.
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Table 2: Occupational Categories
Category
Agriculture and Forestry 1
Mining, Mineral winning, Stonery, Material production 2
Chemical industry 3
Paper manufacturing, paper converting, printing, wood processing 4
Metalworking industry 5
Metal-structuring, Engineering 6
Electrical engineering 7
Apparel industry, leather production and processing 8
Food industry 9
Structural and civil engineering 10
Lining, upholstering 11
Wood- and plastic processing 12
Painter, Vanisher, unskilled worker 13
Chemists, Physicist, Mathematicans 14
Technical engineers 15
Merchants 16
Service merchants 17
Transport sector 18
Organisation, Administration 19
Occupation of order and security, Artists, Health service, Social and educational
occupations, other service occupations
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Table 3: Change in Wage Inequality from 1999 to 2006 (Hourly Wages – based on Interval
Midpoints)
80-20 percentile 80-50 percentile 50-20 percentile
1999 2006 1999 2006 1999 2006
All
0.57 0.64 0.29 0.34 0.28 0.30
Low skilled
0.55 0.71 0.25 0.39 0.30 0.33
Med skilled
0.57 0.57 0.31 0.31 0.26 0.26
High skilled
0.56 0.60 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.31
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Table 4: Personal Characteristics 1999 and 2006
1999 2006
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Age 39.9 8.3 41.9 8.3
Percentage Percentage
Low–skilled 9 5
Medium–skilled 74 73
High–skilled 18 22
Occupational category 1 2 2.8
Occupational category 2 2 1.7
Occupational category 3 1.1 1
Occupational category 4 1.9 2.7
Occupational category 5 11.5 8.5
Occupational category 6 4.6 2.9
Occupational category 7 0.6 1.3
Occupational category 8 2.7 1.8
Occupational category 9 3.7 1.6
Occupational category 10 2.2 1.1
Occupational category 11 1.9 1.2
Occupational category 12 1.3 0.7
Occupational category 13 4.1 4
Occupational category 14 10.3 8.9
Occupational category 15 5.2 6.2
Occupational category 16 4.7 4.5
Occupational category 17 7.9 6.7
Occupational category 18 15.4 19.3
Occupational category 19 5.2 3.9
Occupational category 20 12 19.3
Table 5: Classification of the tasks
Category Tasks
Non-routine analytic developing, researching, designing and gathering information, investigat-
ing, documenting
Non-routine interactive informing, advising and training, teaching, tutoring, educating and orga-
nizing, planning/preparing working processes and promoting, marketing,
public relations and buying, providing, selling and to be supervisor
Routine cognitive measuring, controlling, quality checks
Routine manual fabricating, producing goods and supervising, controlling machines and
transporting, stocking, posting
Non-routine manual repairing, patching and nursing, serving, healing
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Table 6: SO–Task–Index (averages) by skill-group for the years 1999 and 2006
Category
Low skilled Med skilled High skilled OVERALL
99 06 99 06 99 06 99 06
Non-routine ana-
lytic
8.3 23.6 15.7 26.2 43.8 54.4 20.1 32.3
Non-routine in-
teractive
16.6 21.5 30.2 28.6 46.5 41.5 32 31.0
Routine cogni-
tive
35.5 52.5 48.8 57.4 37.6 44.4 45.6 54.4
Routine manual 43.7 40.9 39.8 35.5 17.8 12.8 36.2 30.8
Non-routine
manual
20.1 20 31.9 24.3 21.9 11.8 29.1 21.2
TOTAL CHANGE (06 - 99)
Non-routine ana-
lytic
15.3 10.5 10.6 12.2
Non-routine in-
teractive
4.9 -1.6 -5 -1
Routine cogni-
tive
17 8.6 6.8 8.8
Routine manual -2.8 -4.3 -5 -5.4
Non-routine
manual
-0.1 -7.6 -10.1 -7.9
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Table 7: AFL–Task–Index (averages) by skill-group for the years 1999 and 2006
Category
Low skilled Med skilled High skilled OVERALL
99 06 99 06 99 06 99 06
Non-routine ana-
lytic
3.2 10.9 6.1 11.7 17.9 26.8 8.0 14.9
Non-routine in-
teractive
23.4 28.3 36.1 36.1 56.4 52.7 38.7 39.4
Routine cogni-
tive
8.9 14.8 10.7 13.4 6.8 8.8 9.8 12.4
Routine manual 52.5 36.9 31.7 27.0 10.1 7.6 29.7 23.3
Non-routine
manual
11.7 9.1 15.2 11.7 8.7 4.1 13.8 9.9
TOTAL CHANGE (06 - 99)
Non-routine ana-
lytic
7.7 5.6 8.9 6.9
Non-routine in-
teractive
4.9 0 -3.7 0.7
Routine cogni-
tive
5.9 2.7 2 2.6
Routine manual -15.6 -4.7 -2.5 -6.4
Non-routine
manual
-2.6 -3.5 -4.6 -3.9
Table 8: Subjective Job Complexity SJC (averages) by skill groups for the years 1999 and
2006
Low skilled Med skilled High skilled OVERALL
99 06 99 06 99 06 99 06
Subjective Job Com-
plexity
2.8 3.1 3.4 3.6 4.6 4.7 3.5 3.8
TOTAL CHANGE (06 - 99)
Subjecitve Job Com-
plexity
0.3 0.2 0.1 0.3
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Table 9: Objective Job Complexity NJC (averages) by skill groups for the years 1999 and
2006
Low skilled Med skilled High skilled OVERALL
99 06 99 06 99 06 99 06
Objective Job Com-
plexity
3.14 4.02 4.37 4.49 4.98 4.61 4.39 4.5
TOTAL CHANGE (06 - 99)
Objective Job Com-
plexity
0.88 0.12 -0.37 0.11
Table 10: Estimated Model 1999: AFL–
Task-Index without occupations
Parameter for Estimate (Standard Error)
cond. expectation
(β0, β1)
Constant 3.2367 (.0038)
Lowskill -.0677 (.3363)
Highskill -1.8784 (.2890)
Age .0327 (.0052)
Age2 -.0003 (.0001)
Lowskill*Age -.0038 (.0175)
Lowskill*Age2 .0001 (.0002)
Highskill*Age .0927 (.0144)
Highskill*Age2 -.0010 (.0002)
AFL1 .3013 (.0343)
AFL2 .1892 (.0224)
AFL3 .2255 (.0295)
AFL4 .0581 (.0203)
NJC .0089 (.0019)
SJC .0156 (.0029)
PC use .1153 (.0091)
Parameter for Estimate (Standard Error)
heteroskedasticity
(γ0, γ1)
Constant -1.0441 (.0076)
Age -.0543 (.0095)
Age2 .0007 (.0001)
Lowskill .1255 (.0286)
Highskill .0026 (.0223)
AFL1 .1801 (.0774)
AFL2 .2907 (.0502)
AFL3 -.2868 (.0718)
AFL4 .0515 (.0473)
NJC .03441 (.0039)
SJC -.0062 (.0060)
PC use -.0269 (.0200)
Table 11: Estimated Model 2006: AFL–
Task–Index without occupations
Parameter for Estimate (Standard Error)
cond. expectation
(β0, β1)
Constant 3.2643 (.0064)
Lowskill .1156 (.6660)
Highskill -1.3665 (.4088)
Age .0502 (.0070)
Age2 -.0005(.0001)
Lowskill*Age -.0151 (.0335)
Lowskill*Age2 .0002 (.0004)
Highskill*Age .0684 (.0203)
Highskill*Age2 -.0007 (.0002)
AFL1 .1893 (.0454)
AFL2 .0507 (.0364)
AFL3 -.0240 (.0452)
AFL4 -.0697 (.0377)
NJC -.0032 (.0027)
SJC .0186 (.0042)
PC use .1542 (.0131)
Parameter for Estimate (Standard Error)
heteroskedasticity
(γ0, γ1)
Constant -.9042 (.0111)
Age -.0098 (.0122)
Age2 .0001 (.0001)
Lowskill .1825 (.0445)
Highskill .2784 (.0268)
AFL1 -.1715 (.0791)
AFL2 -.2813 (.0670)
AFL3 -.5324 (.0797)
AFL4 -.2327 (.0677)
NJC .0391 (.0047)
SJC -.0130 (.0076)
PC use -.0920 (.0251)
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Table 12: Estimated Model 1999: AFL–
Task–Index with occupations
Parameter for Estimate (Standard Error)
cond. expectation
(β0, β1)
Constant 3.2363 (.0037)
Lowskill .0946 (.3269)
Highskill -1.6854 (.2810)
Age .0335 (.0050)
Age2 -.0003 (.0001)
Lowskill*Age -.0117 (.0169)
Lowskill*Age2 .0002 (.0002)
Highskill*Age .0820 (.0140)
Highskill*Age2 -.0009 (.0002)
Occup1 -.3808 (.0323)
Occup2 .0301 (.0285)
Occup3 .0685 (.0354)
Occup4 .0246 (.0280)
Occup5 .0321 (.0196)
Occup6 -.0056 (.0231)
Occup7 .0212 (.0468)
Occup8 -.1344 (.0290)
Occup9 -.0249 (.0241)
Occup10 -.0358 (.0285)
Occup11 -.0639 (.0286)
Occup12 .0079 (.0344)
Occup14 .1036 (.0216)
Occup15 -.1495 (.0265)
Occup16 .0608 (.0276)
Occup17 -.0889 (.0201)
Occup18 .0549 (.0219)
Occup19 -.0268 (.0240)
Occup20 -.0331 (.0221)
AFL1 .2694 (.0346)
AFL2 .2145 (.0234)
AFL3 .1775 (.0297)
AFL4 .0869 (.0217)
NJC .0097 (.0019)
SJC .0113 (.0028)
PC use .0791 (.0096)
Parameter for Estimate (Standard Error)
heteroskedasticity
(γ0, γ1)
Constant -1.0696 (.0076)
Age -.0449 (.0095)
Age2 .0006 (.0001)
Lowskill .1263 (.0288)
Highskill .0049 (.0224)
AFL1 .1376 (.0786)
AFL2 .3413 (.0504)
AFL3 -.2772 (.0726)
AFL4 .0604 (.0477)
NJC .0294 (.0039)
SJC -.0063 (.0061)
PC use -.0250 (.0200)
Table 13: Estimated Model 2006: AFL–
Task–Index with occupations
Parameter for Estimate (Standard Error)
cond. expectation
(β0, β1)
Constant 3.271 (.0065)
Lowskill .0622 (.6611)
Highskill -1.2227 (.4028)
Age .0509 (.0068)
Age2 -.0005 (.0001)
Lowskill*Age -.0124 (.0332)
Lowskill*Age2 .0002 (.0004)
Highskill*Age .0602 (.0199)
Highskill*Age2 -.0006 (.0002)
Occup1 -.1737 (.0385)
Occup2 .0163 (.0405)
Occup3 .1129 (.0526)
Occup4 .1409 (.0332)
Occup5 .0544 (.0273)
Occup6 .0134 (.0334)
Occup7 .1023 (.0514)
Occup8 -.1801 (.0437)
Occup9 -.0500 (.0412)
Occup10 -.0977 (.0456)
Occup11 -.1093 (.0428)
Occup12 -.0171 (.0549)
Occup14 .1277 (.0288)
Occup15 -.0977 (.0349)
Occup16 .1539 (.0354)
Occup17 -.2020 (.0277)
Occup18 .0465 (.0284)
Occup19 -.1173 (.0341)
Occup20 -.0599 (.0308)
AFL1 .1711 (.0475)
AFL2 .1108 (.0391)
AFL3 -.0877 (.0451)
AFL4 .0103 (.0400)
NJC -.0027 (.0027)
SJC .0129 (.0042)
PC use .1042 (.0137)
Parameter for Estimate (Standard Error)
heteroskedasticity
(γ0, γ1)
Constant -.9343 (.0112)
Age -.0151 (.0124)
Age2 .0002 (.0002)
Lowskill .2117 (.0448)
Highskill .2856 (.0266)
AFL1 -.2430 (.0794)
AFL2 -.3202 (.0672)
AFL3 -.6392 (.0796)
AFL4 -.2919 (.0673)
NJC .0367 (.0047)
SJC -.0081 (.0077)
PC use -.0774 (.0254)
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Table 14: Estimated Model 1999: SO–
Task-Index without occupations
Parameter for Estimate (Standard Error)
cond. expectation
(β0, β1)
Constant 3.2366 (.0037)
Lowskill -.1331 (.3396)
Highskill -1.798 (.2869)
Age .0310 (.0051)
Age2 -.0003 (.0001)
Lowskill*Age -.0011 (.0176)
Lowskill*Age2 .0000 (.0002)
Highskill*Age .0893 (.0143)
Highskill*Age2 -.0010 (.0002)
SO1 .0930 (.0166)
SO2 .1142 (.0118)
SO3 .0600 (.0078)
SO4 -.0258 (.0135)
SO5 -.0890 (.0126)
SJC .0166 (.0028)
PC use .1307 (.0087)
Parameter for Estimate (Standard Error)
heteroskedasticity
(γ0, γ1)
Constant -1.0456 (.0076)
Age -.0575 (.0094)
Age2 .0008 (.0001)
Lowskill .1128 (.0286)
Highskill .0086 (.0224)
SO1 .1220 (.0338)
SO2 .4776 (.0370)
SO3 -.1084 (.0171)
SO4 .1270 (.0290)
SO5 -.0535 (.0260)
SJC -.0087 (.0060)
PC use -.0245 (.0193)
Table 15: Estimated Model 2006: SO–
Task–Index without occupations
Parameter for Estimate (Standard Error)
cond. expectation
(β0, β1)
Constant 3.2626 (.0067)
Lowskill .0938 (.6684)
Highskill -1.4924 (.3976)
Age .0452 (.0070)
Age2 -.0005 (.0001)
Lowskill*Age -.0145 (.0335)
Lowskill*Age2 .0002 (.0004)
Highskill*Age .0753 (.0197)
Highskill*Age2 -.0008 (.0002)
SO1 .0972 (.0206)
SO2 .0162 (.0249)
SO3 -.0070 (.0117)
SO4 -.0688 (.0193)
SO5 -.0639 (.0215)
SJC .0179 (.0041)
PC use .1584 (.0127)
Parameter for Estimate (Standard Error)
heteroskedasticity
(γ0, γ1)
Constant -.9043 (.0114)
Age -.0077 (.0123)
Age2 .0000 (.0002)
Lowskill .1724 (.0444)
Highskill .2104 (.0278)
SO1 .2334 (.0366)
SO2 .2352 (.0449)
SO3 -.1446 (.0215)
SO4 .0987 (.0363)
SO5 .2256 (.0368)
SJC -.0229 (.0077)
PC use -.1189 (.0247)
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Table 16: Estimated Model 1999: SO–
Task–Index with occupations
Parameter for Estimate (Standard Error)
cond. expectation
(β0, β1)
Constant 3.236 (.0037)
Lowskill .0096 (.3296)
Highskill -1.6216 (.2799)
Age .0324 (.0050)
Age2 -.0003 (.0001)
Lowskill*Age -.0077 (.0171)
Lowskill*Age2 .0001 (.0002)
Highskill*Age .0791 (.0140)
Highskill*Age2 -.0009 (.0002)
Occup1 -.3790 (.0324)
Occup2 .0341 (.0286)
Occup3 .0649 (.0356)
Occup4 .0222 (.0285)
Occup5 .0419 (.0197)
Occup6 .0045 (.0231)
Occup7 .0166 (.0468)
Occup8 -.1284 (.0292)
Occup9 -.0200 (.0246)
Occup10 -.0324 (.0289)
Occup11 -.0681 (.0289)
Occup12 .0057 (.0350)
Occup14 .1152 (.0215)
Occup15 -.1337 (.0266)
Occup16 .0853 (.0277)
Occup17 -.0909 (.0206)
Occup18 .0813 (.0218)
Occup19 -.0029 (.0240)
Occup20 -.0120 (.0222)
SO1 .0710 (.0164)
SO2 .1496 (.0187)
SO3 .0396 (.0082)
SO4 -.0002 (.0146)
SO5 -.0934 (.0130)
SJC .0115 (.0028)
PC use .0857 (.0093)
Parameter for Estimate (Standard Error)
heteroskedasticity
(γ0, γ1)
Constant -1.0721 (.0076)
Age -.0491 (.0095)
Age2 .0007 (.0001)
Lowskill .1145 (.0288)
Highskill .0104 (.0225)
SO1 .0907 (.0339)
SO2 .5077 (.0370)
SO3 -.1092 (.0174)
SO4 .0824 (.0296)
SO5 -.0753 (.0262)
SJC -.0102 (.0061)
PC use -.0274 (.0194)
Table 17: Estimated Model 2006: SO–
Task–Index with occupations
Parameter for Estimate (Standard Error)
cond. expectation
(β0, β1)
Constant 3.2731 (.0068)
Lowskill .0635 (.6586)
Highskill -1.287 (.3878)
Age .0477 (.0068)
Age2 -.0005 (.0001)
Lowskill*Age -.0133 (.0329)
Lowskill*Age2 .0002 (.0004)
Highskill*Age .0635 (.0192)
Highskill*Age2 -.0007 (.0002)
Occup1 -.1646 (.0382)
Occup2 .0281 (.0401)
Occup3 .1312 (.0502)
Occup4 .1361 (.0323)
Occup5 .0612 (.0266)
Occup6 .0327 (.0325)
Occup7 .1154 (.0493)
Occup8 -.1693 (.0431)
Occup9 -.0507 (.0406)
Occup10 -.1028 (.0456)
Occup11 -.1051 (.0414)
Occup12 -.0249 (.0548)
Occup14 .1359 (.0283)
Occup15 -.0927 (.0350)
Occup16 .1641 (.0357)
Occup17 -.2097 (.0276)
Occup18 .0566 (.0281)
Occup19 -.0994 (.0340)
Occup20 -.0525 (.0309)
SO1 .0673 (.0205)
SO2 .0824 (.0257)
SO3 -.0497 (.0119)
SO4 -.0298 (.0206)
SO5 -.0657 (.0223)
SJC .0116 (.0041)
PC use .1073 (.0134)
Parameter for Estimate (Standard Error)
heteroskedasticity
(γ0, γ1)
Constant -.9334 (.01142)
Age -.0080 (.0125)
Age2 .0001 (.0002)
Lowskill .1968 (.0447)
Highskill .2117 (.0277)
SO1 .2245 (.0370)
SO2 .2583 (.0449)
SO3 -.1725 (.0215)
SO4 .0937 (.0365)
SO5 .2521 (.0367)
SJC -.0215 (.0078)
PC use -.1055 (.0249)
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Table 18: Decomposition of 80–20 Wage Differential – AFL–Task–Index without occupa-
tions (based on estimates in Tables 10 and 11)
80-20 80-50 50-20
Overall: 06-99 0.077 (0.011) 0.032 (0.007) 0.045 (0.007)
Char. P 0.03 (0.007) 0.016 (0.005) 0.014 (0.005)
Char. T -0.041 (0.005) -0.018 (0.003) -0.023 (0.004)
Coef. P 0.008 (0.005) 0.011 (0.004) -0.003 (0.003)
Coef. T 0.0004 (0.006) -0.015 (0.004) 0.016 (0.004)
Unexplained 0.079 (0.008) 0.038 (0.004) 0.041 (0.004)
Table 19: Decomposition of 80–20 Wage Differential – AFL–Task–Index with occupations
(based on estimates in Tables 12 and 13)
80-20 80-50 50-20
Overall: 06-99 0.085 (0.011) 0.039 (0.007) 0.046 (0.007)
Char. P 0.024 (0.007) 0.015 (0.005) 0.009 (0.005)
Char. T -0.026 (0.004) -0.012 (0.003) -0.013 (0.003)
Coef. P 0.02 (0.007) 0.015 (0.004) 0.005 (0.004)
Coef. T -0.003 (0.007) -0.013 (0.005) 0.01 (0.004)
Unexplained 0.07 (0.008) 0.034 (0.004) 0.036 (0.004)
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Table 20: Decomposition of 80–20 Wage Differential – SO–Task–Index without occupa-
tions (based on estimates in Tables 14 and 15)
80-20 80-50 50-20
Overall: 06-99 0.077 (0.011) 0.035 (0.007) 0.042 (0.007)
Char. P 0.02 (0.007) 0.013 (0.005) 0.008 (0.005)
Char. T -0.033 (0.005) -0.014 (0.004) -0.019 (0.004)
Coef. P 0.008 (0.005) 0.01 (0.004) -0.002 (0.003)
Coef. T 0.004 (0.006) -0.01 (0.004) 0.014 (0.004)
Unexplained 0.079 (0.009) 0.037 (0.004) 0.042 (0.004)
Table 21: Decomposition of 80–20 Wage Differential – SO–Task–Index with occupations
(based on estimates in Tables 16 and 17)
80-20 80-50 50-20
Overall: 06-99 0.083 (0.011) 0.039 (0.007) 0.044 (0.006)
Char. P 0.015 (0.007) 0.013 (0.005) 0.002 (0.005)
Char. T -0.024 (0.005) -0.013 (0.003) -0.011 (0.003)
Coef. P 0.019 (0.008) 0.011 (0.005) 0.008 (0.004)
Coef. T 0.002 (0.008) -0.009 (0.005) 0.011 (0.004)
Unexplained 0.071 (0.008) 0.037 (0.004) 0.034 (0.004)
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Figure 1: Univariate density estimates of un-
conditional wages
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Figure 2: Decomposition of Changes in Wage Distribution – AFL–Task–Index without
occupations (based on estimates in Tables 10 and 11)
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Figure 3: Decomposition of Changes in Wage Distribution – AFL–Task–Index with oc-
cupations (based on estimates in Tables 12 and 13)
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Figure 4: Decomposition of Changes in Wage Distribution – SO–Task–Index without
occupations (based on estimates in Tables 14 and 15)
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Figure 5: Decomposition of Changes in Wage Distribution – SO–Task–Index with occu-
pations (based on estimates in Tables 16 and 17)
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